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Why we don’t need an academic
rebel alliance
politico.ie 18 May 2011
As an intellectual, the first duty of the academic who
wishes to engage with society is on the level of ideas,
writes Eddie Brennan. Trying to build a new society
within the institutions, language and politics of the
nineteenth century is hopeless; what is needed from
intellectuals and academics is rebellious thought.
Universities may damage your ability to think. This
was the thrust of an article in this month’s Le Monde
Diplomatique where Pierre Rimpert provocatively
discussed the silence of French intellectuals in recent
social upheavals. Essentially, Rimpert argues that the
fact that most of the country’s public intellectuals are
also university researchers or teachers has effectively
stifled French intellectual life.
French academic publishers are cranking out critical
texts to a thriving market. Yet French academics,
particularly in the social sciences, are nowhere to be
seen as critical public intellectuals and, more
importantly, as allies of workers’ and students’
movements. The article begs questions of academia as
a supposed bastion of critical thinking. It also makes
uncomfortable reading for us academics. Not only

may we not be as free in our thinking as we like to
think, there is also the question of whether we have
any relevance to society.
Academics are not intellectuals
It will come as no surprise to many that holding an
academic job does not necessarily mean that you are a
serious thinker. We rarely question how our own
shortcomings and biases as thinkers, teachers and
researchers are shaped by the cultures and constraints
of the institutions we work in.
Before going any further, a full discussion of the limits
of academic work needs to take stock of the
downgrading of academic professionalism, the
explosion of counter-productive managerialism, the
softening up of universities for privatisation and so
on. This, however, is another day’s work. I am
concerned here with the ways that academia, even on
its purest terms, can limit critical thought.
Rimbert writes that today’s revolutionaries need
thinkers who are free from the ‘norms of academic
success and disciplinary straitjackets’. So what are the
limitations of academia? Recognition is probably the
most potent component of academic success. To be
known, and to be taken seriously, is something that
many academics value more than financial reward.
However, building recognition involves politics as
much as accomplishment. One must build affiliations
and connections that are often based on shared
theoretical viewpoints, research subjects or methods.
This leads to the clustering of a small number of

dominant theoretical approaches. Rather than being
tools of understanding then theoretical positions can
become blinkers, serving as marks of allegiance.
Language, another marker of position, is often so
specialised and obscure that it becomes a barrier to
translation across disciplines. Ironically, it can bar the
public from texts that deal with exploitation, power
and exclusion. However, to write in plain English
might suggest a lack of sophistication.
Academic writing often looks like a patchwork quilt of
other people’s words and ideas. It is difficult to say
something in an academic text without demonstrating
that someone else said it before you. This is part of
academic rigour. It is a mark of respect to thinkers
who have gone before us and it creates long debates
through history rather than a cacophony of individual,
isolated comments. It also makes the creation of new
thinking torturously slow.
For Rimpert, academic discipline engenders quietism.
A doctorate, for example, teaches analysis, a body of
knowledge and so on. It also teaches ‘propriety and
precedence’. It ‘encourages a willingness to surrender
strong opinions’. Importantly, it encourages the ‘view
that things are “always more complicated” than they
may actually be’. This leaves little room for rapid,
passionate and committed critique. Rimpert puts it up
to academics that while they may be critical in their
thinking, they also have an apolitical bias built into
the structure of their work. He says this as if it is a bad
thing.

How should academics engage with politics?
The role of the intellectual is not to be a politician.
While Rimpert’s discussion is provocative and
interesting he seems to assume that academics, as
intellectuals, have a duty to ally themselves with ‘antiestablishment’ groups. He sees virtue in a ‘rebel
alliance’ of academics, politicians and activists. I
disagree.
Rimpert celebrates the idea of a ‘rebel alliance’. While
it evokes glamorous visions of May ’68 (or Star Wars)
it is not the automatic duty of progressive intellectuals
to form easy alliances with trade union movements or
activist groups. Behind this there is the danger of
traditional, aesthetic posturing rather than effective
contribution or critique. Historically, the lower middle
classes have tended to build power through apparent
alliances with society’s underdogs. This is often
unconsciously instrumental rather than altruistic.
Academics often speak on behalf of the oppressed at
conferences that the poor will never attend, and in
journals that they will never read. Nevertheless, such
alliances allow academics to feel good about
themselves while building recognition.
There is also a danger that by entering existing
political games one becomes enclosed and limited by
them, and to them. The divide between ‘left’ and ‘right’
provides a perfect example of this type of limitation.
Pierre Bourdieu, an engaged intellectual feted by
Rimpert, pointed out that it is only possible to
advance our conception of the democratic state by
‘rejecting the usual alternative between liberalism and

socialism’. It is ‘one of those damaging dualisms that
impede thought’ (L’Express 18 March 1993). Left/
right offers a choice that is no choice at all. Both are
materialist positions on how the economy should be
managed. All other ways of imagining society beyond
a system of financial exchange are foreclosed. The role
of the intellectual is not to be ‘left-wing’ as Rimpert
seems to assume. It is to transcend the assumptions,
definitions and categories that are handed to us by
society.
Losing our haloes
The role of the intellectual is to offer alternative
visions of the social world. As Bourdieu saw it the
engaged intellectual has a duty to train people in
intellectual self-defence. To give people the tools they
need to see through everyday misrepresentations of
themselves and the world. To do this effectively,
however, intellectuals must be able to see their own
limitations and mistaken assumptions. Rimpert’s
article does a service by prompting academics to
contemplate how their work limits their thinking.
Academics also need to realise that they provide
labour to capitalism like any other worker.
In The Communist Manifesto Marx wrote that the
‘bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every activity
hitherto honored and looked up to in reverent awe. It
has transformed the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the
poet, the man of science into its paid wage labourers’.
From this, Marshall Berman takes the point that
‘nobody in bourgeois society can be pure or safe or
free’.

Intellectuals must recognise the depths of their own
dependence—spiritual as well as economic
dependence—on the bourgeois world they despise. It
will never be possible to overcome these
contradictions unless we confront them directly and
openly (Berman 1988: 119)
While academics may often that feel that they occupy
a place somewhere outside the grubby world of
economics, Marx made it clear that we are only paid
our salaries because we add to capital. Ideas from
universities contribute to management, marketing,
government policy and so on. Journal publishing, for
example, is a transfer of academic and public
resources to private capital. Specialised journals cost
university libraries thousands per annum. Yet the
internet has reduced distribution costs and content is
provided for free by academics eager for publication.
Academic publishers have been making millions from
user generated content since long before Facebook or
YouTube were dreamt of. Academics do not need to
join the workers. They need to realise that they are
workers.
So how should academics engage as intellectuals?
Rimpert points out Bourdieu’s contribution to a rail
workers’ strike in 1995. An intellectual of Bourdieu’s
calibre can bring recognition and legitimation to a
movement. However, we cannot all be Pierre
Bourdieu, Noam Chomsky or Jurgen Habermas. In
any case there are media bottlenecks. Only so many
protests can be recognised and covered. Nevertheless,

academics as intellectuals can contribute to public
discussion through the media.
Like politics, however, the media can enclose thought
within a limited and limiting game. Contributions
need to be timely. Opinion pieces need to be ‘hooked’
onto ongoing stories. As Rimpert points out
intellectual contribution is often reduced to a static
face-off between ‘expertise and counter- expertise’.
Programmes seek contributions on recognised
concerns and rarely seek to raise those concerns
beyond current definitions of politics and the
economy. Meaningful intellectual media contributions
should expand or lead, rather than follow, media
agendas.
There is also a danger, given the academic thirst for
recognition, that being a public intellectual will be
conflated with being a publicised intellectual. We do
not need media coverage or a political platform to
engage with the public. It may lack glamour but our
teaching and research are nevertheless a public
engagement with our students. We can also quietly
share our knowledge with communities outside the
university through further education programmes,
free public lectures and so on.
Academics have a duty to contribute their time and
their intellectual ability to society. Rimbert asks if the
alliance between ‘ordinary working people and
academics’ could be reformed. Academics do not need
to ally themselves with workers’ interests because they
automatically, but often unknowingly, share them.
Nevertheless, academics will not necessarily best

contribute to workers’ struggles, as intellectuals, by
hoisting placards or chanting slogans. Nor should they
be easy, unquestioning allies. Given the current
domination of globalised finance and multinational
capital, intellectual interventions are as important in
dispelling the false perceptions of local business
owners as they are to helping employees. Intellectuals
should not be ‘right’ or ‘left’ but should aim instead to
transcend categories that obscure our view of the
world.
As intellectuals, academics’ social contribution should
be on the level of ideas. To make this contribution, we
must think beyond, and outside of, existing political
and media games. The changes that are needed in the
twenty-first century require new ways of imagining
and describing life, society and governance. We
cannot build a new social world within the
institutions, language and politics of the nineteenth
century. We need intellectual rebels. We do not need a
‘rebel alliance’.

